Summary:
The conversation revolves around the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act in India and its implications on healthcare, particularly regarding the use of WhatsApp for sharing patient data. The discussion highlights concerns about data security, patient confidentiality, and the need for compliance with the DPDP Act. Participants share experiences, suggestions, and concerns about implementing secure practices, such as de-identifying patient data, obtaining informed consent, and not demonising WhatsApp but treating it as a communication tool that needs to be handled with good clinical practice such as data deidentification at source.
*Key Words:*
- DPDP Act
- Healthcare data security
- Patient confidentiality
- Data protection
- Compliance
Conversational learning Transcripts:
*Thematic Analysis:*
1. *DPDP Act and Healthcare:* The conversation emphasizes the importance of understanding and complying with the DPDP Act in healthcare settings to protect patient data.
2. *Data Security Concerns:* Participants express concerns about the risks associated with sharing patient data on WhatsApp and the need for secure alternatives.
3. *Compliance and Implementation:* The discussion highlights the challenges of implementing DPDP compliance in healthcare, including obtaining informed consent, deidentifying patient data, and training staff.
4. *Alternatives to WhatsApp:* Participants suggest exploring alternative secure messaging platforms, such as Signal or Teams, to ensure compliance with the DPDP Act.
5. *Awareness and Education:* The conversation emphasizes the need for awareness and education among healthcare professionals about the DPDP Act and its implications on their practice.
Conversational citations:
๐๐ฃ๐๐ฃ ๐๐ฐ๐ ๐๐ ๐ช๐ต๐ฎ๐๐๐๐ฝ๐ฝ: a user’s thought from the ground Many hospital operations today still run on WhatsApp. • Owners want dashboards on WhatsApp • Patients want reports on WhatsApp • Doctors want images on WhatsApp • Appointments happen on WhatsApp • Nursing handovers happen on WhatsApp Now imagine a ๐ต๐ผ๐๐ฝ๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ถ๐๐ต๐ผ๐๐ ๐ช๐ต๐ฎ๐๐๐๐ฝ๐ฝ for even one day. You’ll quickly see why it’s everywhere—and why it’s so hard to replace. ๐๐’๐ ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฒ (at least for users), it’s on every phone, and it works instantly with almost no learning curve. The DPDP Act is important. ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐๐ฎ ๐บ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐. But healthcare doesn’t operate in theory—it operates in real time, under pressure. Most future “DPDP-compliant” communication tools are ๐๐ป๐น๐ถ๐ธ๐ฒ๐น๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ฏ๐ฒ ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฒ. And those costs will eventually flow back into healthcare delivery. Instead of only thinking about replacing WhatsApp, maybe there’s also room to think about how WhatsApp-like communication can be made safer—with clearer consent, defined boundaries, and accountability. ๐๐ณ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐น๐น, ๐น๐ฎ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐, ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ฑ๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐๐๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ that already work at scale. Just a food for thought—from someone using these tools every single day at the ground level.
From Paulomi Dey on LinkedIn:
Paulomi Dey 1st
CEO | Founder | Ex–Fortune 10 | Healthcare Systems Expert & Leader | Reforming Patient-First, Equitable & Ethical Healthcare with AI
WhatsApp, monetisation, and why this matters for healthcare communication
I want to start by appreciating Shyam Chakraborty for raising this discussion. His observation about usability, security trade-offs, and the limits of consumer platforms sets the right frame for a deeper, platform-level conversation.
From a healthcare standpoint, the conclusion remains unchanged: consumer communication platforms are not designed for regulated, high-risk communication. Healthcare systems require default identity assurance, auditability, consent management, traceability, and clear accountability when something goes wrong. These are core system properties, not optional add-ons.
WhatsApp itself is not a high-risk communication platform in its intended context, and it does not monetise user message content. A more structured and controlled use is possible through the WhatsApp Business API, but that requires deliberate integration and governance.
WhatsApp does not monetise the content of private messages. End-to-end encryption means message text and calls are not readable by WhatsApp or Meta and are not used for advertising or content-based targeting.
WhatsApp’s primary monetisation today comes from business services, not from individual users or message content. Businesses pay Meta to use the WhatsApp Business API for customer communication, notifications, authentication messages, and support at scale. WhatsApp has also started introducing ads in non-chat areas such as the Updates tab and Channels, not inside private conversations.
WhatsApp does collect metadata such as usage patterns, device information, and account details, as disclosed in its privacy policy. However, private message content remains encrypted and inaccessible for advertising. This means WhatsApp’s revenue model is not built on reading private conversations, even though it participates in Meta’s broader ecosystem through metadata and business messaging.
From a technical standpoint, WhatsApp account takeovers occur when identity controls are bypassed at the user or telecom layer, such as OTP sharing, SIM swap or cloning, call-forwarding abuse, or when two-step verification is not enabled.
None of the above makes WhatsApp unsafe in its intended consumer context. It is optimised for scale, simplicity, and frictionless communication, and its design choices are aligned with that goal.
The challenge arises because, in real-world practice, WhatsApp is increasingly used by doctors not just for communication, but informally as a record-keeping and follow-up tool. Messages, images, prescriptions, reports, and clinical decisions often accumulate in chat threads, effectively turning WhatsApp into a de facto EMR-cum-communication system.
This is where the mismatch becomes critical.
Healthcare communication requires systems designed for accountability first, not convenience. When governance, auditability, and clinical responsibility matter, consumer defaults are no longer sufficient.
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10 Comments
Shyam Chakraborty, graphic
Shyam Chakraborty
Managing Director at Oy Trinnect Ltd.
7h
Thanks Paulomi Dey for taking up this issue. Amitav Bachchan once said: "the devil is in the details"- and this 'Amrut-Vani' stuck hard in my head! He is my spiritual Guru .
There are two major issues (and a few minor issues also). The first is, whether WhatsApp is extensively used for doctor-patient information transaction? My take is, yes it is used extensively in doctor- patient, and even intra- hospital communication. Someone just posted on DPDP compliance of WhatsApp very recently.
The second part is, whether WhatsApp's security provisions are adequate for transacting medical informations. You have mentioned WhatsApp is not unsafe for its intended use. Here the question comes, what are the intended use and what are unintended use (of-lebel use). In principle, any user to user communication, be it in real time or a messaging serrvice, should be within the ambit of WA
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Paulomi Dey, graphic
Paulomi Dey
CEO | Founder | Ex–Fortune 10 | Healthcare Systems Expert & Leader | Reforming Patient-First, Equitable & Ethical Healthcare with AI
5h
Thank you, Shyam Chakraborty. That’s a fair point on jurisdiction. I have worked with the US healthcare system in the past, so I am naturally more familiar with HIPAA, which is why I sometimes reference it.
My intent is not to apply US law to the Indian context, but to highlight that the core principles behind HIPAA are universal in healthcare: patient integrity, privacy, consent, accountability, and traceability. Legal frameworks differ by country, but the underlying goals are the same everywhere.
You’re absolutely right that, in India, we are largely dealing with the consumer version of WhatsApp. Its ease of use, ubiquity, and strong security messaging have driven widespread adoption, while the limitations and caveats are rarely discussed. That asymmetry is a real problem.
On the Business API point, I agree that it is currently adopted mainly by larger institutions.
Healthcare communication needs deliberate system design, whether built in-house or via third-party platforms.
So the concern is less about which regulation applies, and more about ensuring that whichever framework governs us, healthcare communication systems are designed to uphold those shared principles rather than relying on convenience-driven defaults.
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Shyam Chakraborty, graphic
Shyam Chakraborty
Managing Director at Oy Trinnect Ltd.
5h
Paulomi Dey we are primarily dealing within the scope of India and HIPAA is legally not relevant- though it is often mentioned due to our US centric thought process. It is also old and manifests serious gaps in the Indian environment. I am also not sure if BAA has any relevance in India.
The problem is, we in India, are dealing primarily with the consumer version, free easy to use and pervasive, and with explicit mention of strong security provisions. The caveats are neither discussed nor indicated. I have also not seen much use of WhatsApp business version here in Finland, every organisation has their own overlay communication servers and services.
DPDP 2023 is the legal provision in India so far, but I doubt even many private practitioners have ever heard about it. So far I have noticed only one mention in the multitude of posts in Linkedin.
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Shyam Chakraborty, graphic
Shyam Chakraborty
Managing Director at Oy Trinnect Ltd.
6h
Shyam Chakraborty 'of-label' -> 'off-label'
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Paulomi Dey, graphic
Paulomi Dey
CEO | Founder | Ex–Fortune 10 | Healthcare Systems Expert & Leader | Reforming Patient-First, Equitable & Ethical Healthcare with AI
6h
It is also important to separate the consumer app from the WhatsApp Business API. The Business API is an enterprise, server-to-server communication platform and is already used by banks and other regulated institutions for client-level authentication, alerts, statements, and real-time interactions. In this model, WhatsApp functions purely as a communication channel connected to institutional systems, with identity, access control, logging, and governance handled on the organisation’s side. It is chargeable, requires verified integration, and the cost is absorbed by the institution, not the user.
From a regulatory standpoint, WhatsApp Business API can be used as a communication channel within HIPAA and DPDP compliant architectures, but it is not itself a compliant healthcare platform. Compliance is achieved through system design, consent management, audit logging, and contractual controls around the API. Responsibility remains with the healthcare provider, not the channel.
The real risk arises when the consumer app, which is not designed to meet healthcare compliance requirements such as BAA, is used informally as a record, workflow, or EMR substitute. That gap between real-world use and design intent is where problems begin.
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Paulomi Dey, graphic
Paulomi Dey
CEO | Founder | Ex–Fortune 10 | Healthcare Systems Expert & Leader | Reforming Patient-First, Equitable & Ethical Healthcare with AI
6h
Thank you, Shyam Chakraborty. I agree with you on both points. WhatsApp is indeed used extensively today for doctor–patient and intra-hospital communication, largely because it fills a practical gap where formal systems are either absent or difficult to use.
On the question of intended versus unintended use, I see the distinction less at the user-to-user level and more at the risk and responsibility level. While WhatsApp is designed for general communication, once that communication starts carrying clinical decisions, records, or continuity of care, the requirements change.
In that context, the distinction is not between “secure” and “insecure,” but between general communication and regulated clinical communication. Encryption alone is not sufficient. Identity assurance, consent, auditability, traceability, and accountability become essential.

1 comment:
Thanks for pointing out the importance of regular health checkups.
Healthcare
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